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ne important issue that has not been discussed today 
concerns the mechanisms and goals of enhanced liquidity 
in the Treasury market. In particular, can enhanced liquidity 
have spillover effects in all fixed-income markets? Market 
participants who trade U.S. Treasuries will feel more 
comfortable venturing out into other markets, which will 
improve market liquidity. So the ramifications are not just for 
the Treasury market, but for all fixed-income markets. I think 
this is an important point that we need to highlight.
The paper by Paul Bennett, Kenneth Garbade, and John 
Kambhu has made a number of interesting findings. In 
addition to discussing this paper, I want to talk more generally 
about the role of the U.S. Treasury market as I see it from the 
dealer community.
The first issue I would like to focus on is STRIPS fungibility. 
Here, I have a couple of points to make. First, when one 
considers the size of the ten-year note and its current reopened 
form, at about $22 billion, one realizes that the marginal supply 
of new ten-year notes would be relatively small. As a result, 
reopening the ten-year note is not going to add appreciably to 
the supply of the rich, liquid benchmark. Unfortunately, as I 
will argue, at the same time there would be a negative 
ramification—given the Treasury’s current penchant for 
conducting reopenings, as opposed to having a regularly 
scheduled new issue every quarter—that could create 
distortions in the yield curve. Second, as was touched upon 
earlier, the whole reconstitution-fungibility issue would make 
the total size of an outstanding issue uncertain at any given 
time. An unstable level of an outstanding size of an issue could 
potentially hurt liquidity.
I want to address this first point in some detail. Currently, 
the ten-year note matures in August 2009. The Treasury, in its 
most recent refunding auction, chose to reopen the August ten-
year issue instead of issuing a security maturing in November 
2009. Presumably, the Treasury plans to issue a new ten-year 
security in February 2000 that would mature in 2010. So what 
you have is holders of the August 2009 and February 2010 
STRIPS feeling very comfortable that they can effectively tap 
into the liquidity of the ten-year sector through a 
reconstitution. Even if they do not conduct the reconstitution 
themselves, they know others can do it. The holder of a 
November 2009 STRIP, by comparison, has no such luck, since 
there will be no outstanding principal payment in the market. 
It is reasonable to say that a November 2009 coupon STRIP 
would trade 25 to 35 basis points cheaper than the two issues 
around it, creating a distortion in the yield curve. I do not 
believe that this is what the authors, or anyone else, have in 
mind when they propose these strategies.
I would like to digress a little bit here because, in terms of the 
fungibility issue, one thing that struck me as a very obvious 
mechanism that could greatly enhance overall market liquidity 
would be to make all bonds strippable. I believe that all bonds 
issued after 1984 are currently eligible to be stripped. As result, 
you have a whole crop of bonds, particularly high-coupon 
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bonds, that perpetually trade cheap because they are not 
strippable. These bonds, which mature between 2002 and 2014, 
are liquidity-impaired because they cannot be stripped. 
Making them strippable would truly enhance the overall 
liquidity of the market because it would create a fresh supply of 
coupon STRIPS, which in turn would actually facilitate the 
reconstitution process.
As a final point on this topic, it struck me while considering 
the fungibility of coupon and principal STRIPS that there is a 
whole class of securities in the marketplace created by the 
dealer community during the 1982-85 period. I am referring 
specifically to CATS, TRs, and TIGRs. Believe it or not, these 
securities are still traded on the Street, but I can tell you without 
equivocation that they have traded with very poor liquidity, 
especially after the 1998 crisis. However, these financial 
instruments are Treasury obligations pure and simple. Like 
other Treasury obligations, they are AAA-rated. Furthermore, 
three or four years ago, the creators of CATS and TIGRs—like 
Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch—decided to change their 
agreements with the custodian banks to allow for, effectively, 
fungibility across the instruments. One could argue that 
making coupon STRIPS fungible with like-maturity CATS, 
TRs, and TIGRs would have a positive impact on Treasury 
liquidity. The ability to interchange these financial instruments 
would greatly enhance the overall liquidity of the market as 
well.
With regard to the two-year issue, I have just a few 
comments. I do not see the appeal of putting the two-year note 
at a mid-quarter funding (that is, mid-quarter of maturity 
date). From a stripping standpoint, there would be no demand 
for a STRIP of a recently auctioned security. Furthermore, 
there are plenty of old five-year notes, ten-year notes, and 
thirty-year bonds that have rolled down into the front end of 
the yield curve that would trade cheaper and would be eligible 
for stripping. I do believe, however, that the 104-week bill 
concept does have some merit for the reasons mentioned by the 
authors: enhancing liquidity and potentially providing the 
Treasury with better funding. Certainly, in conjunction with 
any kind of exchange facility, it is very clear to see the appeal 
there.
I would also like to discuss the exchange program. When 
Bennett, Garbade, and Kambhu talk about micro exchanges, it 
is my impression that what they actually are referring to on this 
micro level is the buyback proposal that the Treasury has talked 
about on a macro level. Considering the dramatic yield 
differences that exist in the market today, issuing ten-year and 
thirty-year securities and buying back twenty-year bonds is not 
very different from what the authors have talked about. In 
some sense, the Treasury already is thinking along 
those lines.
However, one very large problem with the program is that I 
do not see the Treasury willing to carry assets on its books that 
it is not issuing. The Treasury does not issue STRIPS. Instead, 
it issues coupon-bearing bonds that the Street then strips. I do 
not believe that the Treasury will want to have a liability that 
looks like a STRIP. One possible way around the premium 
accounting issue associated with buybacks would be for the 
Treasury to purchase debt in the market and, instead of retiring 
it, to place it in the Social Security trust fund.
In reading the exchange proposal, I found the 2.5 basis 
points to be a very modest amount for the Treasury to consider 
capturing. Frankly, if the Treasury was going to do something 
like that, I would recommend a significantly wider band 
because 2.5 basis points is too small an amount to induce the 
Treasury to get excited—particularly considering the fact that 
existing assets issued several years back, which effectively have 
a Treasury guarantee, do not trade 2.5 basis points cheap to the 
curve. Instead, these assets trade anywhere from 15 to 25 basis 
points cheap. Here, I am referring to Refcorps. Refcorps were 
issued around 1989 as second-generation savings and loan 
bailout bonds. The bonds carry a Treasury guarantee and trade 
significantly cheaper today than they did a year ago. The 
liquidity crisis of 1998 hurt Refcorps. Thus, if the Treasury 
wanted to consider “arbitraging” cheap securities effectively, I 
do not think that a spread of 2.5 basis points is anything to get 
excited over—especially since there are other significant 
opportunities in these markets that could save a lot of money 
for the Treasury and enhance liquidity at the same time.
I also want to turn to some of the comments made by Under 
Secretary Gary Gensler and other discussants. Despite rumors 
to the contrary, the Treasury market is still the benchmark 
market of fixed-income markets. It is where market 
participants go to hedge interest rate risks, whether for on-the-
run Treasuries or futures contracts. I believe that this is not 
going to change tomorrow or in the near future. The steady 
supply of on-the-run securities, as has been alluded to, will 
assure the continuation of that status. Frankly, the benchmark 
status, which Gensler said may eventually move away from the 
Treasury market, has been beneficial to taxpayers and 
bondholders.
In addition, I would like to address the unique role that the 
thirty-year bond plays in the market. There are really three 
separate premiums, if you will, associated with issuance of 
benchmark securities: the repo premium, the liquidity premium, 
and the sector premium. I will focus on the ten-year and thirty-
year sectors first. The repo premium is related to the fact that 
Treasuries trade tight in the repo market after they have been 
issued. In some cases, this premium can last up to a year and a 
half, especially for long-term securities such as ten-year notes 
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securities at a significantly lower yield than it would otherwise; 
this benefit to the Treasury comes to about 20 basis points in the 
ten-year sector and about 15 basis points in the thirty-year 
sector. The liquidity premiums are approximately 5 basis points. 
This means that because these benchmarks have better liquidity, 
people are willing to accept a lower yield, which is worth around 
5 basis points.
The sector premium is a premium that typically is not talked 
about or recognized. This premium is particularly important in 
the ten-year and thirty-year sectors. In 1986, the Treasury 
discontinued the auctioning of twenty-year securities because 
it correctly recognized that the demand for this maturity was 
no longer there. The demand for ten-year issues exists 
primarily because a lot of foreign markets do not issue beyond 
the ten-year maturity. As a result, over the years ten-year 
securities have served as the benchmark for many international 
investors. By comparison, the demand for thirty-year bonds is 
there for long-duration players, who typically have long-
duration liabilities. Moreover, the scarcity of comparable-
maturity thirty-year paper, particularly of high quality, has also 
enhanced the demand for thirty-year bonds relative to that for 
twenty-year securities. Indeed, there truly are three separate 
premiums associated with Treasury securities. If the Treasury 
decides to reduce issuance in the ten-year or thirty-year sectors 
or to allow some other mechanism to replace the current 
Treasury benchmarking, it will effectively result in a large loss 
to taxpayers.
I would also like to point out the fact that the Treasury not 
only issues bills, notes, and bonds in conventional forms, but it 
also issues inflation-linked notes and SLUGS (that is, special 
State and Local Government Securities). I am not going to 
dwell much on the inflation-linked program. However, I would 
like to say that the premiums that I just mentioned, which exist 
for the ten-year and thirty-year sectors, are absent in inflation-
linked notes. It is therefore a very inefficient way for the 
government to raise money, particularly in an era in which the 
government does not actually need it. Furthermore, SLUGS, 
which are issued essentially on a tap basis for deficit-financing 
programs, once again are priced a little bit like Treasuries but 
nothing like the on-the-run Treasury securities. So one could 
argue that perhaps the Treasury should discontinue those 
programs.
Finally, I want to talk briefly about the thirty-year sector 
because I think it is very important. I have already noted the 
scarcity of long-duration high-quality assets. If investors lend 
you money for a long period of time, they generally want to 
know that you are going to be around for a while. Clearly, the 
Treasury plays a special role as an institution free of credit risk. 
This is particularly true in the STRIPS market. Consider the 
cycle of a security that does not get stripped in the first couple 
of years. As the security ages, it cheapens up and tends to get 
stripped when it is about twenty-five to twenty-seven years old 
because of the demand for long-duration assets. By the time the 
security rolls up the yield curve into the twenty-year sector, it 
typically starts getting reconstituted because people no longer 
need that duration; rather, they prefer to be further out on the 
curve. There is a natural inversion on the long end of the curve, 
and the thirty-year issue effectively takes advantage of it and 
the value accrues to the Treasury and the taxpayer.
Another point that I want to stress is that bond futures are 
really the biggest source of market liquidity, possibly aside from 
on-the-run securities. Any interruptions of the supply of 
thirty-year bonds potentially hampers the liquidity in the bond 
futures market, which may not be good for anyone involved in 
the fixed-income markets.
Perhaps as a cautionary tale we should look at the yield 
curve in the United Kingdom. There, the curve is very distorted 
relative to that of other European countries. One reason for this 
distortion is a real supply-demand imbalance in the long end of 
the curve because of recent pension law changes and 
requirements that have led to a dearth of supply. To be honest, 
I do not think that we would ever get to that extreme, with the 
absence of the Treasuries supply, but I believe that the U.K. 
experience could serve as a warning and illustrate the 
important role of the Treasury market. As an aside, the agency 
issues obviously are trying to usurp the Treasury issues’ role as 
the benchmark. However, the agencies are not equipped to issue 
in the thirty-year sector because they do not have assets with 
durations approaching that of a thirty-year security. One might 
say that the agencies currently are being opportunistic in issuing 
thirty-year bonds. It is not clear whether they would actually 
continue to issue these securities over the long haul. Thus, from 
my perspective, the Treasury has a unique role to play.
In closing, I think that many of the ideas discussed here
have a lot of merit. Perhaps with some tweaking and some 
enhancements, one could significantly increase or maximize 
the liquidity of the Treasury market. Maximizing liquidity in 
the Treasury market is coincident with minimizing the 
Treasury’s long-term interest expense. I think it is in everyone’s 
best interest to achieve that goal.
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